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Abstract: 
 
Political involvement varies markedly across people.  Traditional explanations for this variation 
tend to rely on demographic variables and self-reported, overtly political concepts.  In this article, 
we expand the range of possible explanatory variables by hypothesizing that a correlation exists 
between political involvement and physiological predispositions. We measure physiology by 
computing the degree to which electrodermal activity changes on average when a participant 
sequentially views a full range of differentially valenced stimuli. Our findings indicate that 
individuals with higher electrodermal responsiveness are also more likely to participate actively in 
politics.  This relationship holds even after the effects of traditional demographic variables are 
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taken into account, suggesting that physiological responsiveness independently contributes to a 
fuller understanding of the underlying sources of variation in political involvement. 
 
 
 The discipline of political science has long viewed the normative standard of rationality 
as the key to understanding participation in the democratic sphere (see Downs 1957; Aristotle 
2010) and an important element of rationality is typically assumed to be conscious awareness.  
People are presumed to be aware of the “rational” reasons for their political choices.  Relatedly, 
citizens making decisions in a democratic society have traditionally been expected to eschew 
their base emotional predispositions—fear, anger, happiness, and others—in favor of using the 
rationality made possible by their frontal cortex (Neblo 2007). For example, it is often assumed 
that people will participate in politics only when they believe (note the presumption of conscious 
thought) it is worth their time (Downs 1957). This line of thinking is so prevalent historically that 
the founders themselves argued for building institutions capable of protecting political society 
against the foibles of an emotional citizenry (Hamilton, Madison and Jay 1788). The conceit 
seems to be that if people are neither visibly displaying emotion nor consciously feeling the 
effects of emotion, politics will be the better for it.   
 These normative standards frequently do not correspond to empirical observations, as an 
ever-increasing body of research demonstrates that the supposed battle between emotion and 
rationality constitutes a false dichotomy (see Hanoch 2002; McDermott 2004). Spezio and 
Adolphs (2007) note that the emotional and cognitive portions of the brain, rather than working 
against one another, cooperate in a system resembling a feedforward network, with emotional 
appraisal acting as an information processer, passing some information upward for cognitive 
elaboration while other information is never passed on to conscious awareness. Damasio and 
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Damasio (1994) show that without limbic responses the rational cortex has difficulty going 
beyond listing the pros and cons to making and acting upon an actual decision. 
This symbiotic relationship of emotion and cognition (and by inference the vital role of 
affect) is increasingly recognized in recent work on political behavior. Negative emotions such as 
fear or threat, as well as more neutral emotions such as anxiety, lead citizens to pay more 
attention to political information, while anger, it would appear, leads to a reliance on past 
attitudes and behavior (Marcus, Neuman, and MacKuen 2000; Brader 2005; Geer 2006). Further 
evidence, both pro and con, on the role of emotions in politics is provided by Ladd and Lenz 
2008, Marcus, Neuman, and MacKuen 2011, Brader 2011, and Valentino et al. 2008.  
This important and rapidly growing research stream on politics and emotions is 
characterized by two noteworthy features; first, an emphasis on the potential relevance of 
discrete, relatively narrow emotions such as anger, anxiety, fear, happiness, or sadness; and 
second, measurement approaches that require research participants to self-report their felt 
emotions (“did [a particular event] make you feel angry/fearful/anxious?”).  To take one 
example, Valentino et al. 2008 examine the influence of self-reported anger (in response to a 
defined political situation) on political behavior. 
Valuable as this general research design continues to be, it does not capture all of the 
possible “non-rational” influences on political behavior.  Accordingly, our approach is designed 
to add to existing knowledge by making the following changes in approach.  First, instead of 
testing for the effects of a particular emotion we are interested in the possible effects of a broader 
construct that could be called general predisposition to engagement (see Osgood, Suci, and 
Tannenbaum 1967; Marcus 2003). We focus on this broad-based concept, not because we believe 
discrete categories of stimuli have no unique effects (they obviously do), but because we believe 
individuals may also vary in pan emotional response patterns.   We think of this concept as 
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predisposing individuals to engage rather than to demur (see McDermott 2004; Marcus 2003). 
Cross-emotional constructs such as this have been associated with the intensity or drive that 
underlies the extent to which engagement occurs (Bradley 2000; Brehm and Self 1989), greater 
performance in attention tasks (Matthews, Davies, and Lees 1990), and greater memory recall 
when viewing television advertisements (Lang, Dhillon, and Dong 1995), especially negative 
political advertisements (Bradley, Angelini, and Lee 2007). It seems reasonable to hypothesize 
that this heightened attention and awareness also will be accompanied by greater psychological 
engagement. 
Second, instead of relying on survey self-reports of felt emotion, we utilize physiological 
measures.  This is an important shift and merits further explication.  Asking people about the 
particular emotions they may be feeling is a sensible approach, yielding useful and meaningful 
findings, but this procedure does not measure the totality of people’s responses.  After all, 
emotions are defined as “feelings” or, put differently, as “the affective aspect of consciousness” 
[emphasis added] and it has been demonstrated repeatedly that elements of people’s response to 
the environment occur outside of consious awareness.  This statement is true in all areas 
including politics.  For example, a growing body of empirical results shows that political 
decisions are affected by subliminal word prompts (Strahan, Spencer, and Zanna 2002); nearby 
objects of which the decision-maker is not consciously aware (Helzer and Pizarro 2011), and 
even hypnotic suggestion (Wheatley and Haidt 2005).  Galdi, Luciano, and Gawronski (2008) 
demonstrate that implicit attitudes (that is, attitudes of which the individual is not aware) affect 
voting decisions.  In short, much of what is going on in the human nervous system is occurring 
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outside of conscious awareness.1  Humans simply are not built with the ability to describe their 
full physiological state at any given time and reports of conscious “feelings” must be viewed as 
only one slice of this larger condition (see Bargh and Chartrand 1999; Wegner 2002; Lodge and 
Taber 2005; Gazzaniga 2012).   
Moreover, many facts and feelings of which people believe they are consciously certain 
turn out to be completely incorrect (eyewitness testimony is a prime example; see also Deese 
1959; Redlawsk et al. 2010).  Given that responses to the environment do not always register 
consciously, measures of response using only individual self-reports of felt emotions are 
incomplete.  Since physiological measures rely on readings from sensors and not on self-reports 
of feelings, they hold the promise of tapping certain elements of response occurring outside of 
conscious awareness.  By employing this type of measure, small but important advances will be 
possible in understanding the large portion of the decision-making process occurring outside the 
realm of consciously rational thought.  
We believe that research on broad, physiological responsiveness has the potential to 
combine with research on individual, conscious, felt emotions to offer a fuller account of the role 
of conscious and subconscious responses in shaping political behaviors and orientations.   In fact, 
it may be that when variability in broad physiological responsiveness is brought into the 
equation, empirical support for the effects of discrete, self-reported emotions will be enhanced. 
For example, Rudolph, Gangl, and Stevens (2000) find that the interaction of emotions generated 
by a campaign and broader orientations regarding efficacy affects political attitudes. Mondak et 
al. (2010) report a variety of interactions with broad personality traits and discrete, politically 
1 Evolutionary psychology offers sensible reasons that portions of human response should register 
outside of conscious thought.  For example, some needed responses may be quicker and more direct 
without the involvement of consciousness (e.g., pulling one’s hand from a fire prior to realizing that the 
hand is burning) and sometimes keeping information out of conscious awareness prevents overloading.   
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relevant situations that affect political participation.  And Smith et al. (2011) provide evidence 
that self-reported sensitivity to disgust and physiological responses to disgusting stimuli 
independently predict political attitudes on select issues, suggesting that both felt emotions and 
unfelt physiological responses are relevant to politics.  Thus the goal here is to encourage the 
addition of physiological measures to self-reports and not to suggest that these two distinct 
measurement approaches are competing.   
 
 
Causal Order and Theoretical Value 
 Causal forces are sometimes inappropriately and hastily ascribed to variables evincing a 
more biological bent so it is important to note that biology does not always precede higher level 
decisions just as higher level decisions do not always precede biology.  Like most political 
science research, ours is merely correlational and, like most political science research, attribution 
of causal order can only be done provisionally and on the basis of theory.  In the analysis to 
follow, the two main variables of interest are broad physiological responsiveness and political 
participation.  We can and will provide empirical evidence that these two variables are positively 
correlated; we cannot provide empirical evidence that one causes the other.  Readers should bear 
in mind that, as is the case with all regression equations, designation of one variable as 
“dependent” and others as “independent” is a selection made by the researchers on the basis of 
their theoretical understanding of the relationship.  Sometimes this selection is easy, as when one 
variable clearly is temporally antecedent to the other or when controlled, experimental 
interventions are involved, but in most situations judgments must be made.  Invoking biological 
measures in no way alleviates the need to rely on theory in order to come to grips with the likely 
causal order. 
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 On the basis of theory as well as the assertions and practices of previous scholars, we 
construct our regression models with political participation as the dependent variable and broad 
physiological responsiveness as the explanatory variable.  We will explain our logic in a moment 
but readily admit that other theoretical stories could be spun and we encourage readers to do so.  
Adjudicating among these possibilities will not be easy but will be possible with longitudinal 
designs (manipulating broad physiological responsiveness in a lab setting would be challenging 
but may also be possible).  Happily, we believe the correlational relationship we identify is 
interesting no matter what the causal order.  In other words, if broad, physiological 
responsiveness precedes political participation, as our regression models assume, it would 
suggest that physiological traits need to be considered by political scientists (and others) who are 
eager to understand fully the reasons some individuals engage in the political arena and some do 
not.  If, on the other hand, it is eventually demonstrated that an individual’s degree of political 
participation causes changes in that individual’s physiological responsiveness to all manner of 
stimuli, from toasters to toilets and from sunsets to skiers, that would be a remarkable and 
surprising result, suggesting that political participation causes an entire array of non-political 
responses, such as elevated skin conductance in response to seeing a wicker basket. 
 We believe the breadth of our physiological responsiveness measure, covering so many 
types of images, none of which is particularly political, encourages the causal order we suggest.  
In their study of the effects of disgust on political attitudes, Inbar, Pizarro, and Bloom put it well:  
“it seems unlikely political attitudes would shift a person’s general emotional dispositions, 
particularly when it comes to … a basic emotion that emerges long before individuals form 
political attitudes” (2009: 21).  Though it is undoubtedly the case that salient political events can 
affect the physiology of people who care deeply about politics—witness the evidence that 
individuals’ endocrine levels can be affected by whether their candidate for president wins or 
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loses (Stanton et al. 2010), the case being considered here is somewhat different in that 
physiological readings were not taken in proximity to a political event.  Indeed, as mentioned 
before, the stimuli were decidedly non-political.  To be sure, none of this rules out the possibility 
that political participation could cause alterations in broad physiological responsiveness but we 
do feel the somewhat strained nature of this alleged relationship gives us some justification for 
hypothesizing the causal order we do.  This certainly is the direction of the relationship 
hypothesized by the few existing studies connecting individual-level physiological variations to 
political variables (Amodio et al. 2007; Oxley et al. 2008; Kanai et al. 2010; Smith et al. 2011). 
 Moving beyond “which comes first” in order to elaborate on our deeper theoretical vision, 
we believe that physiological measures such as the one we are about to employ are the best routes 
to achieving an indication of the “running tallies,” “standing decisions,” “habits,” 
“predispositions,” “motivated social reasoning,” “automaticity,” “longstanding dispositions,” and 
“antecedent conditions” that have long been seen as crucial to political decisions (Jost et al. 2003; 
Lodge and Taber 2005; Zaller 1992; Mondak 2010; Plutzer 2002; Gerber, Green, and Shachar 
2003; Fowler 2006; Prior 2010; Marcus et al. 1995; Galdi, Luciano, and Gawronski 2008).  
Though they frequently deny it, people do indeed typically enter political situations with 
predispositions and biases—some conscious and some not.  Whether these longstanding 
predispositions are the result of genetics, early developmental events, more proximate 
environmental experiences, or, as seems likely some mix of these sources, measuring dispositions 
is challenging.  This situation is no doubt why, after identifying the importance of longstanding 
forces, most research quickly adds that “understanding the source of these dispositions is beyond 
the scope of this study” (Zaller 1992: 23; Barker and Tinnick 2006: 251).  Given the fact that 
these biases and predispositions are often not in the realm of conscious awareness and therefore 
difficult to measure with traditional approaches, such a strategy makes perfect sense.  Still, the 
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repeated findings demonstrating the importance of these subthreshold biases, standing decisions, 
and implicit attitudes suggest that at some point the effort must be made; otherwise, the discipline 
will only be able to understand the ephemeral forces that push people around their political “set 
point” without ever discovering more about the powerful standing decisions themselves. 
Physiology holds some promise here.  After all, even though these standing decisions are 
not in the realm of conscious awareness, they may retain some tangible presence that physiology 
can reveal.  The logic is simple:  Certain incidents flit into consciousness but fail to alter physical 
response patterns in a tangible manner. Other events leave their mark, sometimes without even 
entering people’s conscious awareness (see Lodge and Taber 2005), building on previously 
retained dispositions and becoming incorporated into the way the body responds to subsequent 
situations.  Physiology in this sense quite literarily embodies longstanding predispositions.  
Physiology can and does change but is at the same time a powerful source of inertia; established 
patterns written into physiology become behavioral defaults.  Change is not something that 
occurs willy-nilly but rather requires sensory detection and then the overriding of established 
patterns (Gray 1990; Marcus, Neuman, and MacKuen 2000).  Viewing longstanding political 
predispositions as physiologically based thus makes a good deal of sense. In fact, it is difficult to 
conceive of a meaningful political predisposition that is ethereally mentalistic and entirely devoid 
of any physical signature; mental states, even those outside of conscious awareness, are known to 
have measurable body characteristics (Smith and Hibbing 2011; Cacioppo, Tassinary, and 
Berntson 2007).   
This conception is given support by virtue of the fact that those physiological measures 
that have been tested over time are reasonably stable (usually the length of time between the test 
and re-test is months but sometimes is as much as a year) and even appear to be heritable (on 
electrodermal activity, see Schell et al. 2002; Crider et al. 2004; on startle eyeblink, see Lee et al. 
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2009; Quevado et al. 2010).  No analyses to date look at the stability of the particular 
physiological measure we employ here but at least the weight of evidence indicates a stickiness 
to physiological variables that can be seen as parallel to the stickiness of political orientations.  
No measure is perfect but physiological indicators may be able to provide some compass on the 
sub-threshold standing biases that heretofore have defied most measurement attempts.  In this 
vein, it may be possible to move beyond demonstrations of the importance of motivated 
reasoning to understanding individual variations in particular motivations.   
 
Measurement and Procedures 
Human phsyiology is amazingly diverse.  The body has many systems and changing 
activity levels in one system often do not correlate well with changing activity levels in another.  
We will employ just one of these many measures but readers should bear in mind that additional 
measures will be necessary before more complete assessments are possible.  The particular 
physiological measure we employ is based on electrodermal activity (EDA). EDA manifests 
itself as small increases in the secretion of sweat at various points on the body; most research, 
including our own, measures EDA at the fingertip (see Dawson, Schell and Filion 2007). EDA is 
especially appropriate for our purposes because other physiological systems, such as the cardio-
vascular, lie under control of both the sympathetic nervous system (SNS) and the 
parasympathetic nervous system.  EDA, on the other hand, lies entirely under SNS control 
(Dawson, Schell and Filion 2007).  As a result, EDA increases are widely accepted in the 
psychophysiological community as reliable indicators of arousal (Kreibig 2010) and as linking 
closely “with the psychological concepts of emotion, arousal, and attention” (Dawson, Schell, 
and Filion 2007).  The highly questionable use of EDA as an indicator of whether or not a single, 
designated individual is telling the truth should not be confused with its acknowledged value as 
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an indicator of the situations under which a group of people, on average, is physiologically 
aroused. 
EDA has been widely used in the field of psychophysiology to get at, for example, overall 
cognitive engagement with one’s environment (Nikula 1991), task vigilance (Dawson, Filion and 
Schell 1989), and conditioned anxiety among those individuals suffering from post-traumatic 
stress disorder (Blechert et al. 2007). In terms of political behavior more specifically, EDA has 
been used as a measure of disgust response that predicts support for sexual morality policy 
(Smith et al. 2011), as a gauge of threat response to predict support for socially protective 
policies (Oxley et al. 2008), and as a measure of anxiety in the face of negative political 
campaigning (Mutz and Reeves 2005).  
It should be noted that, in and of itself, EDA is incapable of indicating valence (and this is 
one of the reasons it is problematic as a lie detector).  Both an image of a snake and an image of a 
loved one typically increase EDA.  Though this situation can be a problem for some research 
designs, the goal here, as stated above, is to acquire a broad measure of physiological response 
and not one that is keyed to, or strives to measure, responses to a discrete category of stimulus 
content.  Thus, to obtain our measure of broad EDA response, we recorded mean changes in 
EDA of each participant occasioned by the presentation of a lengthy series of very diverse still 
images.  We know the stimuli were diverse because an independent panel of 126 individuals 
rated their own emotional responses to these images in terms of valence, with one being 
"happy/positive feelings" and nine being "unhappy/negative feelings,” and also on intensity, with 
one being "no reaction” and nine being a “strong reaction.”  The valence ratings ranged from a 
mean of 1.83 (SD=1.178) for an image of a sunset to 8.42 (SD=.924) for an image of an anorexic 
woman. Strength of emotional reaction ranged from a mean of 2.79 (SD=2.01) for a clean toilet 
to 8.11 (SD=1.208) for the anorexic woman. The raters also were asked to select specific 
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emotions that were elicited by each image, which resulted in an assortment of reported, evoked 
emotions, including happiness, disgust, satisfaction, amusement, anger, fear, sadness and anxiety.  
The ratings show that the images selected for presentation run the gamut from decidedly positive 
(sunset, bowl of fruit, smiling child, cute animals) to decidedly negative (wounds, vomit, physical 
fights and dangerous animals). Each image appeared for 12 seconds on a computer screen 
directly in front of the participant and was preceded for approximately 10 seconds by a fixation 
point on a blank screen. 
 Because individuals vary dramatically in their pre-stimulus EDA levels, and because our 
focus is on the degree of response, we constructed a ratio of change in EDA for each individual 
by dividing the average skin conductance level (SCL) during presentation of each stimulus by the 
SCL obtained during the previous inter-stimulus interval (or ISI). Thus, at stimulus onset, 
increases in SCL relative to the previous ISI provide a ratio above 1, while decreases will 
produce a ratio below 1. We then calculated overall tendency to display physiological arousal by 
computing the mean change in this ratio across all non-political images for each participant. 
These procedures are standard in EDA analyses and the mean magnitude of the EDA response 
we recorded for our sample is typical (see Dawson, Schell, and Filion 2007). What is perhaps less 
typical is our practice of averaging this response across such a wide range of images in order to 
get a broad measure of EDA responsiveness.  As argued above, however, we believe that doing 
so will provide both useful information on its own and also a valuable baseline against which 
physiological responses to particular categores of stimuli can be compared. 
Our basic measure of political participation was obtained from a survey that participants 
completed long before the physiological exercise. Participants were presented with 11 items 
bearing on political participation, with a particular bent toward issue-driven participation: “how 
often do you discuss issues with other people,” “are you registered to vote,” “do you usually vote 
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in elections,” “do you feel strongly about political issues,” “have you voted for particular 
candidates because of their position on a political issue,” “have you campaigned for particular 
candidates,” “have you contributed money to particular candidates,” “have you contacted elected 
officials to encourage them to support a position on a political issue,” “have you tried to persuade 
other citizens to support a position on a political issue,” “have you joined an organization that 
promotes a position on a political issue,” and “have you attended meetings that promote a 
position on a political issue.” The item gauging frequency of political discussion was a five-point 
scale but all of the others were dichotomous “yes-no” items. Each of the individual items was 
standardized and factor analyzed using principal-components factoring, with an overall measure 
of political participation created by multiplying respondents’ scores on each item by its factor 
loading and summing the products of the individual participation items together.2 Weighting the 
individual participation items by their factor scores makes it possible to create a participation 
index that includes only the items’ shared correlation with the underlying construct of political 
participation while discarding the portion of covariance not explained by that construct.3 
 Participants in this project were obtained in the following manner.  We contracted with a 
professional survey organization to randomly contact individuals within convenient distance from 
Lincoln, Nebraska, to see if they would be willing to travel to our lab for a 90 minute session in 
exchange for $50.  In this fashion, 200 subjects were recruited and completed an extensive, 
2 We used a 1-factor solution from the principal-components factor analysis to create the overall participation 
index. The factor loadings for each of the individual participation measures were as follows: register to vote 
(.468), vote (.639), frequency of political discussion (.759), feel strongly about an issue (.819), issue voted 
(.824), campaigned for a candidate (.599), contributed money (.651), contacted elected officials (.658), 
attempted to persuade others (.817), joined a political organization (.736), and attended meetings on an issue 
(.583). 
3 As a check we also created a version of the participation index by standardizing and summing the individual 
items without weighting. This measure correlated very highly with the principal-components-derived measure 
of participation (r = .974, p < .001) and, as might be expected given the high correlation coefficient, did not 
produce substantively different results than those produced by the factor-derived measure of participation. 
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computer-based survey of their political beliefs, personality traits and demographic 
characteristics.  This is the survey that included the items on political participation mentioned 
above. It was intended that these participants would serve as a pool from which we could recruit 
smaller groups for physiological testing as money and lab time became available. Several months 
after the larger group completed the survey, 37 individuals with relatively strong political 
ideologies (either liberal or conservative) were invited back. A year later 51 additional 
participants from the pool were invited back, with this group consisting of some who were 
politically disinterested and uninvolved and others who were more engaged in the political 
process. We make no claim that these 88 individuals constitute a random sample. Their 
willingness to travel to participate in lab exercises on two separate occasions, for example, is an 
obvious source of bias. Still, for our purposes recruiting a purely random sample is less crucial 
than securing a group of people with a wide range of political participation levels. 
 On the second trip, research participants were brought to our physiology lab one at a time 
and sensors measuring EDA were attached to the distal phalanges (fingertips) of the index and 
middle fingers on participants’ non-dominant hand.  After an acclimation period, the series of 
images was presented.  The participant was not required to perform any behavioral task—only to 
pay attention to the images on the screen.  Data from two participants were not usable.  One was 
discovered to have a health problem and the readings for the other were corrupted perhaps 
because of a misplaced or malfunctioning sensor. 
(Table 1 about here) 
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for the participation index and for the standard 
sociopolitical variables.  As mentioned, individuals in the 2007 study were recruited because they 
possessed strong ideologies while the 2008 group was more diverse and these facts are reflected 
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in the relatively high mean participation index for the 2007 participants; the mean value of the 
participation index for the 2008 group is negative because the variables were standardized prior 
to executing the principal-components factor analysis. Mean age in both samples was just over 40 
years old, income levels averaged in the $40,000 - $60,000 range and respondents tended to have 
completed at least a few years of college. Finally, similar numbers of males and females were 
recruited overall, though there is some unevenness within each individual year. 
Results 
Given that different images were presented to participants in 2007 and participants in 
2008 and given the differences in the mean participation levels of the respondents in each year, 
we include a dummy variable for year (group) in our baseline analysis. We conducted ordinary 
least squares regression for four separate models, shown in Table 2. Model 1 included only 
traditional sociopolitical variables (age, gender, income, education) as well as the year of each 
group (2007 or 2008).  As can be seen, the dummy for year performs as expected, picking up the 
higher participation levels of the 2007 group.  Controlling for this effect in a multiple regression 
model, education was the only significant predictor of participation, with increasing levels of 
education not surprisingly associated with higher scores on the participation index (b = 1.007, p < 
.05). 
(Table 2 about here) 
Model 2 includes the aforementioned sociopolitical variables but adds our measure of 
EDA responsiveness into the mix. As before, education has a significant and positive relationship 
with participation but now we see that EDA responsiveness also contributes significantly and 
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positively to the model (b = .225, p < .05).4  Adding EDA responsiveness nets a significant 
change in the variance accounted for by the model (ΔR2 = .033, p < .05).5 In fact, an examination 
of effect sizes reveals an especially interesting finding: education, so often the most important 
predictor of political participation, contributes little more to the model (r = .25; partial η2 = .07) 
than does EDA responsiveness (r = .23; partial η2 = .06). 
Finally, we estimated separate models for the demographic and physiology variables by 
year, shown in Model 3 (2007) and Model 4 (2008). The fit for Model 3 (2007) is not significant 
(p = .256), likely due to the combination of a small sample size and a lack of variance in the 
dependent variable for that year (recall that participants in 2007 were selected for their strong 
political views). Even so, the effect size for EDA responsiveness in Model 3 remains the highest 
of any variable in the model, a not inconsequential r = .29; partial η2 of .10.  Model 4, which 
includes only those participants from 2008, retains a significant model fit. Both education and 
EDA responsiveness are significant (p < .05 and p < .10, respectively) and, in fact, both 
contribute substantially to the model in terms of their effect sizes (r = .35 and r = .24, 
respectively; partial η2 = .13 and η2 = .06).  Education is a crucial predictor of political 
participation but even when controlling for education, EDA responsiveness remains important as 
well. 
These connections between education, EDA responsiveness (easily the two strongest 
variables in all of the models), and political involvement merit further consideration.  Both 
4  The measure of EDA responsiveness was divided by 1,000 to make the size of the coefficient closer to that for the 
other variables. 
5  Because tests of increment to R2 favor the partitioning of variance to variables entered into the model first, this is 
a conservative test of whether physiological variable contributes meaningfully to our understanding of political 
participation.  
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theoretically and empirically, educational levels and EDA responsiveness are reasonably distinct 
concepts.  Education is likely to be capable of stimulating political involvement regardless of an 
individual’s EDA responsiveness just as EDA responsiveness is likely to be capable of enhancing 
political involvement regardless of an individual’s educational level.  As such, we hypothesize 
that each of these concepts can compensate for the other.  EDA responsive people are likely to 
get involved in politics; educated people are likely to get involved in politics; but those lacking 
both will be doubly disadvantaged and are likely to demonstrate the lowest levels of political 
involvement.  Previous research suggests the value of interacting biological and environmental 
variables (Caspi et al. 2003; Fowler and Dawes 2008), and we are in a position to further 
empirical findings along these lines.  Given the differences in the 2007 and 2008 groups, we 
tested our hypothesis by creating 2– and 3–way interactions between education, physiological 
responsiveness and year. Given that introducing interaction terms often leads to multicollinearity 
between the individual predictors and their products, we centered the education and physiological 
responsiveness variables prior to creating interaction terms (see Neter, Wasserman, and Kutner 
1989). If we are correct, the interaction between education and EDA responsiveness should be 
negatively related to political involvement.  The results are presented in Table 3. 
(Table 3 about here) 
With small N studies such as ours, results should be taken as provisional—particularly 
when they involve interaction terms.  Still, the results presented in Table 3 are suggestive. 
Physiological responsiveness continues to show a significant main effect and continues to be 
associated with greater levels of participation. However, the previously significant main effect for 
education is not significant in the interaction model. More to the point, the interaction between 
education and EDA responsiveness is indeed negatively–signed, meaning that EDA 
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responsiveness has the largest effect among those individuals with the least education and that 
education has the largest effect among those individuals with the lowest levels of EDA 
responsiveness.  Individuals with low EDA responsiveness and low levels of education display 
remarkably low levels of political participation relative to the rest of our sample.  Provisional as 
they are, the results in Table 3 do provide an indication of the potential value of interacting 
biological variables with the type of variables traditionally analyzed by political scientists.   
(Table 4 about here) 
The index of participation used in Tables 2 and 3 combines a broad range of activities and 
previous research on participation demonstrates that specific conditions and traits may have 
variable effects on individual types of participation (see Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1995). As 
a result, we tested for the effects of EDA responsiveness on individual modes of participation. 
Given the need to preserve degrees of freedom, Model 2 from Table 2 serves as our baseline 
model and the one we estimate for the individual elements of political participation.  In Table 4, 
we report logistic regression models for the 10 dichotomous measures of participation.  Similar 
results (not reported) were obtained for discussion, the only non-dichotomous measure in our 
participation index. After controlling for standard sociopolitical variables, increases in EDA 
responsiveness are associated with increased odds of participating in each of the individual 
political acts and this relationship is significant for registering to vote (p = .052), voting (p = 
.026), campaigning on an issue (p = .032), contacting officials about an issue (p = .013), and, 
marginally, for attending meetings on an issue (p = .091). The strength of the relationship with 
overall participation seems to be coming from voting, campaigning, and contacting but no type of 
involvement is negatively affected by higher levels of EDA responsiveness.   
Conclusion 
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This study of the correlates of political involvement departs from existing research in 
several ways.  Perhaps most importantly, it uses physiological measures to explain political 
phenomena, a practice that was encouraged by the pioneering work of Wahlke and Lodge (1972) 
but which was not much employed until recently (Lieberman, Schreiber, and Ochsner 2003; 
McDermott 2004; Mutz and Reeves 2005; Boudreau, Coulson, and McCubbins 2009; Soroka and 
McAdams 2010; Hatemi and McDermott 2011).  Physiological measures of autonomic nervous 
system activity are potentially valuable because, though previous work amply demonstrates that 
people’s self-reports of their feelings and emotional states are relevant to important political 
outcomes, much that is occuring in the human mind and body is outside the realm of conscious 
thought and thus not captured by survey self-reports.   
Further, our study solicits participants’ responses to emotional stimuli generally rather 
than to discrete categories of stimuli such as disgust or fear or anxiety (Inbar, Pizarro, and Bloom 
2009; Feldman and Stenner 1997; Valentino et al 2011; and Marcus, Neuman, and MacKuen 
2000).  We refer to this concept as broad physiological responsiveness and suggest that research 
on discrete emotions may be enhanced by taking into consideration an individual’s general 
responsiveness.  In other words, work on response to discrete categories of stimuli could yeild 
better results if adjustments are made for each individual’s general proclivity to respond to 
stimuli.  We also encourage research on intermediate categories.  For example, it would be useful 
to know if some people are more oriented to negative (including the specific categories of 
disgust, fear, disappointment, etc.) rather than to positive stimuli (satisfaction, happiness, 
contentment, etc.) and if this variation correlates with political activity.  Future research should 
begin with the assumption that all methods of organizing stimuli are in play, from the broadest to 
the narrowest.   
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The breadth of our EDA responsiveness measure and the fact that it appears to correlate 
with political participation raises questions about whether it would correlate similarly with other 
types of life activities.  Would it correlate with participation in religious activities?  With 
participation in social organizations?  With participation in choral societies and soccer clubs?  
Designing research to answer these questions would help to place politics in context.  Is there 
something different regarding the competitive nature of politics that would render its connections 
to broad EDA responsiveness unique or does politics follow patterns similar to other life 
activities?  In considering these possibilities, it should be noted that elevated responsiveness to 
stimuli is hardly an unadulterated positive.  Many mental and emotional pathologies, including 
autism and schizophrenia, are thought to be linked to elevated sensory responsiveness (Baron-
Cohen 2003).  Perhaps future research in this area will want to be alert for the presence of non-
linear relationships but the larger point is that it is clearly not the case that physiological 
responsiveness to environmental stimuli is merely a stand-in for overall good health—and 
apparently it is not merely a stand-in for general socioeconomic status (since income and 
education are controlled in our multivariate analyses and EDA responsiveness still registers an 
independent effect). 
In sum, most likely without fully realizing it, certain people are more physiologiocally 
responsive than others to stimuli generally; moreover, variations in this degree of responsiveness 
are positively associated with involvement in the political arena.  This simple finding leaves 
much unexplained, including the connection of broad EDA responsiveness to life activities other 
than politics and the extent to which this general effect is traceable to specific emotions.  Though 
we have pitched this particular study at the broadest possible level of responsiveness, our 
suspicion is that each human is a unique combination of general responsiveness tendencies and 
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responsiveness keyed to specific categories of stimuli.  If we are correct that physiological 
concepts are able to measure in part the automatic, motivated, habitual, default, implicit, 
predisposed, biased, standing orientations that have been shown to undergird decisions, including 
political decisions, new research avenues will materialize since it would become possible to do 
more than merely acknowledge the importance of sub-threshold predispositions.  Setting aside 
the complex factors that likely shape evolving physiological response patterns in the first place, 
value exists in recognizing that these physiological response patterns are the embodiment of the 
reasonably stable predispositions that are so central to people’s political decisions and actions.  
Rather than merely noting that “when it come to politics, you’ve either got it or you don’t” (Prior 
2010) physiology may offer a way to begin to measure “it.”    
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics for Model Variables 
 
 Mean Std. Deviation Observations 
    
    
2007    
    
Participation Index 7.200 4.210 37 
    
Age 42.541 6.559 37 
    
Income Level 3.811 1.469 37 
    
Education Level 4.892 1.524 37 
    
Gender 22 males 15 females 37 
    
∆ Physiological Resp. 0.999 0.005 37 
    
2008    
    
Participation Index -.389 5.577 51 
    
Age 41.216 8.259 51 
    
28 
Income Level 3.509 1.475 51 
    
Education Level 4.333 1.322 51 
    
Gender  23 Males 28 females 51 
    
∆ Physiological Resp. 1.002 0.005 51 
    
    
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. OLS Models for Demographic and Physiological Variables 
 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
     
     
Age 0.008 0.009 0.100 -0.045 
 (0.073) (0.712) (0.119) (0.092) 
     
Female -.410 -0.295 0.655 -0.447 
 (1.084) (1.060) (1.464) (1.538) 
     
Income 0.006 0.023 0.614 -0.606 
 (0.400) (0.391) (0.540) (0.566) 
     
Education 1.007* 0.954* 0.380 1.606* 
 (0.406) (0.398) (0.476) (0.622) 
     
Phys. Responsiveness  0.225* 0.254# 0.261# 
  (0.102) (0.140) (0.150) 
     
2008 -6.955* -7.865*   
 (1.112) (1.163)   
     
Constant 2.491* -221.694* -256.142# -264.024# 
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 (3.872) (101.799) (141.565) (149.026) 
     
Model Fit .000 .000 .256 .059 
R2 .411 .45 .18 .21 
Observations 88 88 37 51 
     
     
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < .05 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3. OLS Model Interacting Education and Physiology 
 
Variables Participation 
  
  
Age 0.032 
 (0.073) 
  
Female -0.423 
 (1.084) 
  
Income -0.138 
 (0.395) 
  
Education 0.035 
 (0.603) 
  
Phys. Responsiveness 0.269# 
 (0.165) 
  
Education * Physiology -0.209# 
 (0.115) 
  
2008 -7.958* 
 (1.165) 
  
Education * 2008 -1.422# 
 (0.806) 
  
Physiology * 2008 -0.017 
 (0.219) 
  
Education * Physiology * 2008 0.147 
 (0.161) 
  
Constant 7.342* 
 (3.314) 
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Model Fit .000 
R2 .48 
Observations 88 
  
  
Interaction terms and their constituent parts are centered variables. 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < .05, # p < .10 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4. Logit Analyses 
 
Variables Register to Vote Vote Issue Vote Campaign Issue Position 
      
      
Age 1.030 1.048 1.030 1.114 0.974 
 (0.049) (0.040) (0.050) (0.065) (0.034) 
      
Female 1.572 1.887 1.538 0.565 0.702 
 (1.330) (1.233) (1.225) (0.375) (0.355) 
      
Income 0.914 0.844 0.938 1.507 0.822 
 (0.288) (0.199) (0.274) (0.385) (0.163) 
      
Education 1.992* 1.565# 1.944* 0.830 1.575# 
 (0.679) (0.415) (0.550) (0.194) (0.307) 
      
Phys. Responsiveness 1.204# 1.194* 1.151# 1.173* 0.943 
 (0.115) (0.095) (0.098) (0.089) (0.043) 
      
2008 0.069* 0.023* 0.155* 0.275* n/aa 
 (0.089) (0.028) (0.147) (0.214)  
      
χ2 15.67 26.71 12.11 16.60 9.14 
p .016 .000 .000 .011 .104 
Pseudo-R2 .27 .30 .33 .22 .08 
Observations 88 88 88 88 88 
      
      
Coefficients are odds ratios. Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < .05, # p < .10  
a All participants in 2007 reported holding an issue position, thus variable year was omitted from this model. 
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Table 4 Continued.Logit Analyses 
 
Variables Donate Contact Official Persuade Interest Group Attend Meet. 
      
      
Age 1.034 1.066 0.971 0.956 0.935 
 (0.045) (0.047) (0.034) (0.035) (0.042) 
      
Female 1.104 0.721 0.561 1.010 0.649 
 (0.630) (0.407) (0.303) (0.521) (0.394) 
      
Income 1.352 1.066 0.786 1.141 1.563# 
 (0.287) (0.222) (0.163) (0.215) (0.370) 
      
Education 1.006 1.329 1.776* 1.430# 1.072 
 (0.214) (0.276) (0.386) (0.285) (0.245) 
      
Phys. Responsiveness 1.047 1.162* 1.053 1.022 1.103# 
 (0.054) (0.070) (0.055) (0.049) (0.064) 
      
2008 0.165* 0.059* 0.079* 0.177* 0.109* 
 (0.106) (0.039) (0.055) (0.099) (0.079) 
      
χ2 14.41 32.64 31.86 20.08 18.74 
p .025 .000 .000 .003 .005 
Pseudo-R2 .15 .29 .27 .18 .20 
Observations 88 88 88 88 88 
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